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INTRODUCTION
This discussion deals with problems which confronted the oil
industry of California a few years ago and save for the prompt
and decisive action of the courts of this state, would seriously
have threatened its integrity. I refer to a practice of drilling oil
wells, to which we loosely have applied the term "whipstocking"
or "crooked hole" drilling.
[.. T]he virulent germs of the disease were active. Opera-
tors possessing barren properties realized the huge dividends
which- could be reaped by so drilling their wells as to bottom
within and produce from the rich deposits of their neighbors.
Had the practices initiated been continued, the inevitable and
ultimate result would have been the destruction of the oil indus-
try ....
[Riecently the state has been shocked by the revelation of
widespread violations of the law in the East Texas Field and in
other fields. Recently published reports indicate that a total of
568 wells have been shut in as a result of the discovery of
crooked holes drilled in violation of the rules and regulations of
the Railroad Commission. In addition, 64 more wells have been
shut in because wells had been junked before they could be
tested by the officers of this state. These wells have been pro-
, Kline, Subsurface Trespassing, 5 J. MARSHALL L.Q. 30, 30-31, 36 (1939-1940).
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ducing at a rate of approximately 3 million barrels of oil each
year, and the investigation of still more wells suspected of illegal
deviation is still proceeding.
2
Drilling for oil or gas, as with other mineral development,
can concern the rights and interests of a multitude of parties.
One drill-site tract may involve the separate and individual in-
terests of oil and gas lessors, lessees, unleased oil and gas mineral
owners, nonparticipating royalty owners, and surface owners
(assuming a severance of the oil and gas from the surface estate).
If the well is drilled off the vertical to the extent that the well
bore crosses subterranean property lines, the rights of other
parties are also affected. If such a well penetrates a tract in
which the drilling party has no rights, a trespass has taken place.
Conversion follows if oil or gas is wrongfully removed from the
well.
With the discovery that wells could unintentionally "wan-
der" or "stray" from the vertical, or be purposely deviated
from the vertical, and with the development of surveys that
could determine the degree and direction of deviation, the courts
increasingly were faced with the task of sorting out the various
rights and remedies of parties owning interests in tracts in which
subsurface trespass had occurred by the drilling of a crooked
well or a controlled directional well. A number of issues may be
encountered in such a case. For example, who is entitled to
production from a slanted well? What are the remedies of the
aggrieved party in a subsurface trespass case if the well is a
producing well or a dry hole? If the oil and gas estate has been
severed from ownership of the surface on the surface-location
tract, who must consent to the surface use (surface owner, oil
and gas owner, or both)?
This Article attempts to answer these and other questions by
analyzing the development of decisional law in this area. An
historical perspective of the problems of early crooked holes and
the creation of surveying and deflection tools is followed by an
examination of the rights and obligations involved in permissible
2 GENERAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE, OFFICIAL REPORT To Ti 58TH LEGISLA-
TURE OF TEXAS ON SLANT-HOLE INVESTIGATIONS, at 6 (1963).
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directional drilling. The law of subsurface trespass relating to
illegal directional wells and the law of conversion are reviewed.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
At an early stage in the history of well drilling it was dis-
covered that oil and gas wells could inadvertently deviate from
the vertical.' Such wells have been referred to as crooked wells.
4
However, almost all wells deviate from a true vertical plane to
some degree.5 The actual difference between a straight hole and
a crooked hole is one of degree: a straight hole will not signif-
icantly vary in direction or angle of deviation over a given
distance of the hole; a crooked hole will vary.
6
Wells can stray from a straight vertical path by encountering,
during drilling, certain types of rock structure. 7 It has been
suggested that the tendency of bore holes to migrate horizontally
increased when the rotary rig began to replace the cable tool rig
in popularity.'
Some early crooked wells were determined to stray from
their intended vertical courses to astonishing degrees. One well,
drilled to a measured depth of 5,100 feet, had wandered some
2,470 feet horizontally, resulting in the hole being needlessly
drilled 800 feet further than a straight hole would have required. 9
Another well, with a measured depth of 5,683 feet, deviated
"For many years we have known that exploratory core holes in mining regions
may be crooked. For several years attention has been given to this matter in California,
where numerous cases of crooked holes are on record." Lahee, Problem of Crooked
Holes, 13 BrLL. AM. A. PETROLEUM GEOLOGISTS 1095 (1929).
" A crooked well has been defined as "[a] well which deviates from the vertical."
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS 207 (7th ed. 1987).
' C. CATLIN, PETROLEUM ENGINEERING 142 (1960) (if the well is aimed directly
below the surface and its deviation is at a small angle, it is considered a vertical hole);
see also Lahee, supra note 3, at 1096.
6 J. ZABA & W. DOHERTY, PRACTICAL PETROLEUM ENGINEERS' HANDBOOK 481
(5th ed. 1970).
I "The path of the drill bit in many early wells looked much like a corkscrew
due to deflection of the bit by boulders encountered in the course of drilling." Castle-
berry, Tort Liability in Oil and Gas Operations, 4 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 281, 307
(1958); see also Lahee, supra note 3, at 1124 (a drill bit encountering a hard rock
stratum at an acute angle will tend to follow the plane of the stratum; if the hard
stratum is encountered at an obtuse angle, a more direct penetration is likely to occur).
I Lahee, supra note 3, at 1105.
9 Id. at 1105.
[VOL. 4:235
DIRECTIONAL DRILLING
some fifty-six degrees from the vertical, resulting in a hole with
a bottom displaced 2,252 feet horizontally from its surface lo-
cation and a true vertical depth of only 4,893 feet (790 feet less
than the total length drilled).' 0 In one case, two wells with
surface locations 2,000 feet apart actually intersected at a vertical
depth of some 6,115 feet.'" Such unintentional deviation from
the vertical is unlikely today, because better drilling techniques'
2
and controlled directional drilling produce holes which may de-
viate as little as one degree or less from a true vertical direction.
13
The consequences of crooked wells are serious. Geological
subsurface mapping is unreliable and may cause a possible mis-
interpretation of geologic structures if reports of the vertical
depth of producing intervals are not accurate. 4 Obviously, the
costs of drilling increase if a well must be drilled further to
reach the targeted geologic formation because the hole is not
drilled vertically. Mechanical problems may result from crooked
holes, such as a twisting off of the drill stem, the collapsing or
parting of the pipe, and the premature wearing of the sucker
rods and tubing." Too, the great care made in selecting prom-
ising geologic targets is vitiated if the well bore wanders signif-
icantly from the vertical. One geologist noted that:
In the light of what we now know about the deviation of bore-
holes the care with which well locations are measured off and
surveyed on the ground becomes almost a joke. Arguments
are not uncommon as to a choice between two points as little
as 50 feet apart, for the location of a hole to be drilled to a
depth of 3,000 feet to 4,000 feet. Indeed, how often is it not
true that a location is surveyed just one foot more than the
Id. at 1113.
GATLIN, supra note 5, at 142.
, Drillers have learned to employ a variety of methods to keep holes straight,
including:
-changing the weight on the drill bit ("increased weight on bit results in increased
hole deviation");
-varying the drill collar size ("large drill collars, being stiffer, are less subject to
bending");
-planning hole size and using stabilizers ("increases the hole-straightening force
imposed by the pendulum weight"). Id. at 144-52.
13 Castleberry, supra note 7, at 307.
See GATLIN, supra note 5, at 142; Lahee, supra note 3, at 1131.
, Lahee, supra note 3, at 1127.
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required distance in order to insure the correct offset spacing! 1
6
The crookedness of early wells was determined by down-hole
surveying instruments such as the acid bottle.' 7 Surveying instru-
ments such as the single shot directional instrument, introduced
about 1930,18 were later developed which could measure not only
the degree of deviation, but the direction of deviation as well.' 9
Soon thereafter, deflection tools were designed that could correct
and control hole deviation.
20
16 Id. at 1127.
" GATLIN, supra note 5, at 142. An acid dip survey is "[a] method of determining
the inclination of a well bore by lowering a glass container of hydrofluoric acid into a
borehole. In a brief period of time, the glass is etched by the acid, permitting the
determination of the inclination of the borehold." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4,
at 11.
'a See generally Eastman, Directional Drilling, 1960's, reprinted in J. BRANnv,
HISTORY OF On. WELL DRILLING 1182, 1202 (1971). This instrument is "an open-shuttered,
delayed time exposure camera, which photographs a magnetic compass for direction and
a form of plum bob for vertical angle." Id.
'9 1 W. SUMMERS, THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS § 26, at 86 (1954). One writer has
described these types of surveying instruments as follows:
[Measuring vertical deviation and horizontal direction] is accomplished with
various devices which combine the plumb-bob or pendulum reading With
a simultaneously recorded compass reading. The compass used is either
magnetic or gyroscopic. The instruments used . . . are often classified as
single shot or multiple shot, depending on the number of readings obtain-
able from a single run.
A unique surveying device is the gyroscopic instrument .... This utilizes
the ability of a gyroscope to maintain the same directional orientation over
a considerable time period .... The timing device is set to take pictures
at the desired intervals with a record of time, vertical angle, and direction
being recorded. ... Surveys are taken both going in and coming out of
the hole. This is the equivalent of two separate sets of measurements which
serve to check each other. This device ... is the only instrument which
can be run inside the casing on a wire line.
GATIN, supra note 5, at 158-59. More sophisticated wireline tools, known as dipmeters,
are available for determining the well bore's deviation from vertical. However, these
tools are only operable in uncased or open holes. These tools are especially useful since
they also allow measurement of formation dip. See generally VicENrr, GARTNEaR & A-rALI,
GEODIP-AN APPROACH To DETAILED DEP DETERMINATION USING CORRELATION By PAT-
TERN RECOGNITION (1977) (presented at the 52nd Annual Fall Technical Conference and
Exhibition of the Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME).
2o One of the early deflection tools was the whipstock, which appeared before
1933. BRATLY, supra note 18, at 1174. A whipstock "is a long, slender, tapered steel
wedge with a concave groove on its inclined face, supported in the well in such a position
that the drilling tool is deflected from the previous course of the well toward the
[VOL. 4:235
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Using deviational and directional survey and deflection tools
enabled drillers to drill relatively straight, vertical holes. These
new tools also enabled them to drill controlled directional wells;
"wells which are intentionally aimed at horizontally displaced
bottom hole targets.
' 21
The ability to purposely deviate a well in one direction, with
a high degree of accuracy and reliability, has practical benefits.
Frequently the surface overlying the promising geologic target is
not a practicable drill site location. The surface may be residen-
tially or commercially developed, covered by water, environmen-
tally fragile, too rugged, or otherwise unsuitable for surface
operations. By means of directional drilling, the well may be
commenced from an acceptable surface location and bottomed
at (or near) the target location. 22 With the technology to drill
directional wells came the control to drill practically vertical
holes. It has been suggested that since this precision is available,
a well significantly departing from the vertical would apparently
only be drilled deliberately or negligently.
2 3
Of course, the consequences of a crooked hole or a con-
trolled slant hole are not solely the concern of the geologist and
drilling engineer. A deviation from the vertical as slight as four
degrees (in one direction) at a vertical depth of 5,000 feet will
lead to the well being horizontally bottomed some 348.50 feet
distant from the surface location of the well. 24 If the drill-site
direction in which the inclined grooved surface faces." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
4, at 1077-78. Other deflection tools include the knuckle joint, involving a "universal
joint enabl[ing] the lower part of the tool to rotate at a different angle from the drill
stem, thus changing the drift and the direction of the hole" and the spudding bit, a
"chisel-shaped tool" used to achieve a hole deflection of from one to four feet, following
which a bit with a smaller diameter than the original bore follows the depression, weight
is applied, and the drill pipe forms "a bow in the direction opposite the depression,
thus producing additional deflection of the hole." See BRANTLY, supra note 18 at 1174-
79.
2" GATLIN, supra note 5, at 142.
22 See BRANTLY, supra note 18, at 1182.
23 "It seems safe to say that the plea of good faith in drilling a trespassing
directional well will rarely be favorably received in court today. With the making of
directional well surveys a standard oil field practice, most trespasses would seem to be
intentional or at least inexcusably negligent." 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW § 227, at 396.4 (1986).
14 See J. ZABA & W. DOHERTY, supra note 6, at 484. A deviation of no more than
four degrees from the vertical has often been required in drilling contracts. See Smith,
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tract is small or if the surface location is close to a property
line, such a deviated well may be surfaced upon one tract yet
bottomed under another. Assuming the well operator has no
rights to drill into the bottom-hole tract, an actionable trespass
has occurred.
II. PERMISSIBLE DIRECTIONAL DRILLING
Assume that ABC Oil Company has identified a promising
oil target some 5,000 feet deep. Also assume that the surface
overlying the target is covered by a large shopping mall and
office complex. The oil company has an oil and gas lease cov-
ering the tract upon which the shopping mall and office buildings
are situated. ABC also has an oil and gas lease on a tract, the
surface of which is vacant, some 1,500 horizontal feet away
from the oil target. There has been a severance on this second
tract whereby the surface is owned separately from the oil and
gas. ABC proposes to drill a controlled directional well on the
vacant tract, bottoming the hole at the intended target lying
beneath the shopping mall. A third tract lies between the vacant
tract and the commercially developed one. ABC Oil Company
also has a valid oil and gas lease on this intervening tract.
A. Surface Rights
1. User and Excessive User
Does ABC Oil Company have the right to drill the directional
well from the vacant surface tract?
Unquestionably ABC has the right tb surface its well on the
vacant surface tract if both the instrument severing the surface
from the oil and gas estate and the oil and gas lease grant such
rights. However, if those instruments are silent concerning the
use of this tract for the benefit of another tract, ABC will have
to rely on implied rights. 25 A mineral owner or lessee may
Rights and Liabilities on Subsurface Operations, 8 INST. ON Om & GAS L. & TAX'N 1,
3 (1957).
25 See 4 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF On, AND GAS § 652 (1962) (discussing the legal
relations between a lessor and lessee as it effects use of the surface); Comment, Implied
Rights of the Oil and Gas Owner in the Surface, 26 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 227 (1954).
[VOL. 4:235
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impliedly use the surface of a tract in any way reasonable to the
development of the minerals underlying that tract. 26 However,
the right to use the surface of one tract for the benefit of another
tract will not be implied. 27 Such unauthorized use will constitute
an "excessive user.''28 The surface owner should prevail in en-
joining the drilling operation in a trespass action or suing for
damages based upon the value of the unauthorized surface use.
29
2. Exclusive and Nonexclusive Rights
Assume that both the instrument severing the oil and gas
from the surface and the oil and gas lease covering the vacant
tract in the hypothetical noted above authorize ABC Oil Com-
pany, the oil and gas lessee, to make a surface location on that
tract for a well to be directionally drilled to other lands. May
the surface owner similarly grant to other oil and gas developers
the right to directionally drill from this tract?
1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATiSE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2(d) (1987) (detailing
the operating rights of oil and gas lessees including use and occupation of land and use
of substances present).
27 E.g., Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
938 (1957) (mineral lessee's use of water, rock, and roads on one tract for operations
on adjacent tract improper); Tutwiler v. Etheredge, 231 So. 2d 93 (Ala. 1970) (mineral
owner may not cut road across surface of one tract to get to adjacent tract upon which
he plans drilling operations); Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960) (right
to use water-flooding method to enhance production from wells on other lands could
not be implied from lease), on later appeal, 380 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1964) (concerning
calculation of damages); Annotation, Right of Owner of Title to or Interest in Minerals
Under One Tract To Use Surface, or Underground Passages, In Connection with Mining
Other Tract, 83 A.L.R.2D 665 (1962).
' See Chevron Oil Co. v. Howell, 407 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). Up-
holding an injunction brought by the surface lessee and the oil and gas and mineral
lessee-the two estates had been severed-of the drill site tract against Chevron, the
directional driller, despite consent of the surface owner to the drilling operation. The
court noted that should Chevron build pits and storage tanks, "it cannot reasonably be
said that such installations would not interfere with and do damage to appellee Howell
as holder of the agriculture and grazing lease to the surface." Id. at 528. See also H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 218.4 and § 218.8 and cases cited therein
(explaining excessive use of surface easements); E. KUNTZ, supra note 26, § 3.2(d), at
94 (concerning right to use and occupy land).
29 See Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946) (in suit where
defendant hauled coal from other lands across plaintiff's tract, as to coal from other
tracts for which defendant did not have such right, plaintiff was entitled to receive the
value of the illegal use of the easement); H. WrLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 23, §
218.8, and 226.7 (discussing remedies available to surface owners).
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California has concluded that the mineral owner's or lessee's
rights to such surface use are exclusive if the mineral owner or
lessee would suffer harm from surface use by another. In Han-
cock Oil Co. v. Meeker-Garner Oil Co.,30 plaintiff was the
assignee of an oil and gas lessee whose lessors had granted
defendant oil company a surface location for a directional well
to be bottomed under defendant's adjoining lease. Plaintiff sought
to enjoin the surface use of his lease tract by defendant. The
court held that the directional well would injure the plaintiff
through drainage from beneath plaintiff's lease tracts and that
the injunction should issue.3"
A Texas case, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. L. & G. Oil
Co.,32 determined that the oil and gas lessee could not enjoin
the fee simple owner of the lease tract from using the surface
thereof as the surface-location tract for a directional well to be
drilled into other lands. The lessee was unable to convince the
trial court that the drilling of the directional well would interfere
with its leasehold rights, and the appellate court affirmed."
The Texas and California cases do not address the same
concerns. The California court emphasized the drainage that
might occur to the owner or lessee of the oil and gas under the
surface-location tract.14 The Texas cases have been concerned
with possible interference to the surface operations of the min-
eral owner or lessee on its own tract (that is, does the lessee
need for its own use the surface that will be occupied by the
directional-well operation?)." Under the Texas view, the oil and
10 257 P.2d 988 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
11 "[O]ne who drills through leased land to cause drainage from it violates the
lessee's rights and commits a trespass against him. Such conduct being a trespass against
the lessee, it can make no difference that the owner-lessor has consented." Id. at 992.
3 259 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Case Note, Oil and Gas - Surface
Owner's Right to Drill a Well From His Property, the Mineral Lease of Which is Held
by Another, and Bottom it in Adjoining Land Leased to the Driller, 32 TEX. L. REV.
353 (1953-54).
11 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953). Accord Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959).
" See Hancock Oil Co. v. Meeker-Garner Oil Co., 257 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
" See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953). It should be noted that Humble Oil & Ref. Co. did not discuss the
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gas lessee will find it much more difficult to prevent the surface
owner from authorizing a third party to use the surface of the
tract for the drilling of a directional well. There will be no
finding that such use ipso facto will damage the mineral owner
or lessee.
3 6
The California position offers much more protection for the
oil and gas lessee, as the lessee does not have to show a need
for the surface area in question; it only needs to establish a case
of drainage.37 Note, too, that plaintiff's oil and gas lease in-
volved in Hancock Oil Co. expressly gave the lessee the exclusive
right to use the property for oil and gas development. 8 The
Texas court in Humble Oil & Refining Co. did not refer to the
terms of the lease.39 Though most oil and gas leases do grant
such exclusive rights, the terms of the granting instruments must
always be closely examined.
3. Policy Considerations
If the right to use the surface for oil and gas development
is not made exclusive by the pertinent instruments, who should
have the right to give or withhold consent?
One view of the policy considerations applicable to this
question advocates that only the surface owner's permission
should be required where no drainage from the surface location
tract can be shown to result from the directional well. 40 If
drainage would result, the permission of both the surface owner
issue of drainage; perhaps it was not alleged. In Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff,
321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), the plaintiff had alleged drainage but the trial
court found none. The court noted "[dirainage presents no new problem. The rule of
capture is settled law .... Under that rule, an injunction may not be used as an
instrument to protect a lessee from the risk of drainage." Id. at 169-70 (citations
omitted).
36 See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
31 See Hancock Oil Co. v. Meeker-Garner Oil Co., 257 P.2d 988, 992 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1953).
38 Id. at 990.
" See also Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959), where the court pointed out that the oil and gas lessee did not prove the terms
of the lease, apparently relying on an implied right of exclusivity of surface use. Id. at
168-69. The court was unwilling to imply rights without a showing of the express rights
embodied in the lease. Id.
I H. WI.LLIMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 218.6, at 220.
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and the oil and gas owner or lessee would be required. 41 Another
view holds that, regardless of drainage, consent should be re-
quired of both the surface and oil and gas owners of the surface-
location tract where the two estates have been severed.
42
The latter view is logically sound. Because the implied rights
of the mineral owner or lessee to make reasonable use of the
surface do not extend to the use of the surface for the benefit
of other tracts, 43 the surface owner's consent should be required.
However, even if the oil and gas owner or lessee is not hindered
in his operations on the tract, nor his estate damaged by drain-
age, his permission should be required in addition to that of the
surface owner. This position is urged because of the possibility
that drainage or some other type of damage could later be
brought about to the mineral estate."
B. Bottom-Hole Rights
Certainly an oil and gas operator who possesses a valid lease
covering the bottom-hole tract has the right to drill into the
subsurface of such tract from adjacent lands. This right logically
follows from the lease grant itself. The owner of the surface
overlying the bottom-hole tract can hardly complain that his
permission was not sought when the tract is not being used for
surface operations. (Indeed, the oil and gas lessee would not be
required to seek any permission from the surface owner for
surface use of the mineral-producing tract under the doctrine of
implied surface rights of the mineral owner or lessee discussed
above.)
41 Id. at 223-24. Williams and Meyers would not require the joinder of nonoper-
ating interests (the oil and gas lessor, nonparticipating royalty owner, etc.). Id.
41 E. KUNTZ, supra note 26, § 12.8, at 357.
,' See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
" See notes 58 and Il1 infra. For further discussion of the use of the surface for
a directional well, see Hutchens, The Case of the Crooked Hole and its Effect on the
Rights of Surface and Mineral Holders, I S. TEx. L.J. 184 (1954); Comment, Oil and
Gas: Interference with the Lessee's Rights by Surfacing a Well on the Leased Premises
and Drilling Directionally to Bottom the Well Outside the Leased Land, 25 OKLA. L.
REv. 289 (1972); Comment, Implied Rights of the Oil and Gas Owner in the Surface,
26 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 277 (1953-54).
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The oil and gas produced from a directional well belongs to
the owner of the bottom-hole tract. 4  This follows from the
general principle of ownership cujus est solum, ejus est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos: he who owns the soil owns upward
unto the sky and to the depths.4 In A. E. Bell Corp. v. Bell
View Oil Synd. 47 the defendant drilled two wells which were
surfaced on its lease tract but bottomed under plaintiffs' lease
tracts. The defendant urged that an owner of land overlying an
oil and gas stratum has, in common with all other property
owners overlying the stratum, the right to drill and extract the
oil and gas even if the well extends beyond the vertical bound-
aries of that owner's tract. 48 The court, refuting this position,
stated, "no one has a right, by reason of the ownership of a
surface location lying above an oil zone, to extend his oil wells
without the boundaries of his own surface location, vertically,
extended downward so as to trespass upon the premises of
adjoining owners. ...
4' A. E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Synd., 76 P.2d 167, 178 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1938), aff'd on rehearing, 116 P.2d 786 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Note, Oil and Gas
- Liability for Withdrawal of Oil by Underground Trespass, 50 HARv. L. REV. 703
(1937); Note, Oil and Gas - Deviation of Wells From the Vertical - Liability for
Subsurface Trespass, 16 Tax. L. REV. 543 (1938).
" 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 18. "The owner of the surface of the land
is prima facie the owner of the soil or mineral objects to the center of the earth, and
any underground encroachment by an adjoining owner is a trespass or nuisance"
(emphasis in original). Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L.
REv. 631, 684, at n. 161 (1928), citing I TIFFANY, TIE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 252,
at 865-66 (2nd ed. 1920). Consider, however, the comment of the Louisiana court
concerning the narrowing of a tract's size as the center point of the earth is approached.
Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 959 at n.9 (La. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 925 (1986). See also IA G. THOMPSON, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 155 (1980 repl.) (subterranean ownership is in the shape of an "inverted cone").
11 76 P.2d 167 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938), aff'd on rehearing, 116 P.2d 786 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
41 76 P.2d at 171.
1 Id. at 176. Accord Edwards v. Lachman, 534 P.2d 670, 676 (Okla. 1974)
(rejecting argument of defendant that plaintiff should not recover for oil drained from
defendant's own lease tract in a case involving a directional well drilled by defendant
and bottomed under plaintiff's tract). See also Smith, supra note 24, at 4:
The surface owner or his lessee may drill into the productive strata under-
neath his surface ownership. He may bring the oil and gas to the surface
and acquire title to the same even though a portion of the production has
been drained from under his neighbor's land. The doctrine goes not one
inch further. Certainly it does not authorize slanting a well under adjoining
land without the permission of the adjoining owner.
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Of course, the application of the doctrine of the vertical
ownership of land may be qualified by spacing laws which have
the effect of giving all owners of oil and gas within a certain
distance of the producing interval of the well bore a right to
share in production therefrom.50 With such a spacing law, if the
point at which the well bore penetrates the producing interval is
within the minimum spacing distance of an adjacent tract, the
owner of the adjacent tract should share in the production along
with the oil and gas owner or lessee of the bottom-hole tract.
C. Intervening-Tract Rights
In the hypothetical case posited in Section II, supra, the well
was going to be surfaced on a vacant lot, pass through the
subsurface of a second tract, and bottom under the tract overlain
by a shopping mall. What are the rights of the owner of this
second, intervening tract?
The case law on this topic is scant. However, there is a
California case in which lessors had granted an oil and gas lease
on their property for a primary term of one year with the usual,
indefinite secondary term to endure as long as either oil or gas
was produced from the property. The lessors also executed an
addendum, later replaced by a separate amendment, granting
the lessee the right to drill traverse wells" under or through the
property for a stated sum. One well was drilled vertically on the
property and four traverse wells were drilled through it (that is,
neither surfaced upon nor bottomed under the premises). Upon
" See, e.g., Howard v. Kingmont Oil Co., 729 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987)
(applying a spacing law found at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 353.610 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1983)); Loeffler v. King, 228 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), rev'd on other grounds,
236 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1951) (applying a spacing rule promulgated by the Texas State
Railroad Commission). The effect of spacing laws of the type involved in the cited cases
is to grant to all owners of oil and gas interests within the spacing area a right to share
in the production therefrom. In this respect, the spacing laws have curtailed the early
rule of capture. "Where a well is improperly drilled and produced in violation of spacing
regulations, the owners in the common source of supply from which the oil is produced
are entitled to recover the value of their proportionate part of the oil produced." 5 E.
KUNTZ, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 77.2, at 392 (1978).
11 "A well drilled through but not bottomed under the premises in question."
WLLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, at 1022 (citing Sehle v. Producing Properties, Inc.,
41 CAL. RPTR. 136 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964)).
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abandonment of the vertically-drilled well, the lessors sued to
have their title quieted by having the lease declared terminated
by the permanent cessation of production from the vertical well.
The court held that the lessee's right to continue to produce the
traverse wells did not terminate with the termination of the oil
and gas lease.
2
What permission should be sought for the drilling of a well
through a tract in which the minerals are severed from the
surface, the well to be neither surfaced thereon nor bottomed
thereunder? Apparently no case directly addresses the question."
Accordingly, until the issue is settled, it is recommended that an
easement be acquired from both the surface and mineral owners
of the severed estate.
It is submitted, however, that once the issue is presented,
the better view would be that the mineral owner alone should
be able to grant the easement for such a traverse well. Though
the surface owner may be the owner of what has been called the
"matrix ' '5 4 of the subsurface, the drilling of a well bore some
hundreds or thousands of feet below the earth's surface through
52 Sehle v. Producing Properties, Inc., 41 CAL. RrR. 136 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1964). The court found the lease and the traverse well agreement to be separate agree-
ments, each standing on its own. The right to drill directional wells through the property
was in the nature of an easement not dependent upon the profit a prendre created by
the lease. Id. at 138.
13 But cf. Union Oil Co. v. Domengeaux, 86 P.2d 127 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939)
(Where plaintiffs were oil and gas lessees of intervening tracts through which a trespassing
slant well had been drilled. The court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to a
judgment enjoining the defendants from operating the well and ordering it plugged to
the extent it trespassed. The opinion does not mention whether there had been a severance
of the surface and mineral estates prior to the granting of the leases. Note too that in
granting the injunction the court emphasized the drainage that would be done to the
plaintiffs' leaseholds. No mention was made as to what party should have the subsurface
easement-granting power.).
' Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. 1974) ("the matrix
of the underlying earth"); SUMMERS, supra note 25, § 758.1, at 66 (Supp. 1987) ("the
misnamed 'surface' owner ... actually owns the matrix of the underlying earth");
Maxwell, The Meaning of "Minerals" - The Relationship of Interpretation and Surface
Burden, 8 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 255, 285 (1976) ("the soil and its supporting matrix");
Scott, Underground Storage of Natural Gas: A Study of Legal Problems, 19 OKLA. L.
REv. 47, 60 (1966) ("the term 'surface' refers to the matrix of the earth, from its core
to its crust."). A matrix is "[a]n embedding or enclosing mass; esp. the rock-mass
surrounding or adhering to things embedded in the earth, as metal . . . fossils, gems
and the like." 6 TmtE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 238 (1933).
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such supporting structure is unlikely to cause any harm thereto.
Indeed, it seems that the only subsurface substances of particular
value penetrated by the well bore would almost necessarily be
minerals, rather than any subterranean matter surrounding the
minerals.
If one takes the view that the nature of "surface" ownership
should logically be thought of in terms of subjacent support
rather than as an extractive right,56 then the surface owner will
not suffer any tangible harm to the estate that it may be pre-
sumed he is to enjoy by the grant or reservation creating the
severance. The mineral owner, however, may find that the
"manner of enjoyment ' 5 7 intended in the grant or reservation
of his estate has been diminished." Thus it is the position of
" It is beyond the scope of this Article to treat the legal distinction between the
words "surface" and "minerals" as used in conveyancing. Literally reams of articles
have addressed this topic. For a partial listing see Lowe, What Substances Are Minerals?,
30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-1, 2-2 at n.3 (1984). It appears from the many conflicting
and confusing decisions from the American jurisdictions, however, that the burden upon
or possible destruction of the surface estate in the extraction process and the economic
value of the substance in question have been the primary (even if sometimes unstated)
tests in distinguishing "surface" from "minerals." Thus, for example, absent surface
destruction, the following substances have generally been held to be minerals: gold,
silver, diamonds, bauxite, iron, uranium, gypsum, oil, gas, coal, and lignite. The
following substances have generally been held not to be minerals: peat, rock, limestone,
shale, sand, gravel, and clay. See Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals, " 54
N.D.L. Rav. 419 (1978) and the cases cited therein. "In determining whether a substance
is a mineral, an important criterion is whether the substance has economic value; that
is, whether the substance is more valuable than the land in which it is contained .... "
Id. at 430. Perforce, the penetration and damage to a valuable mineral-for example,
uranium or an oil-and-gas-bearing stratum-is a greater economic loss to the owner
thereof and to society than a penetration of a subsurface nonmineral substance such as
limestone.
56 See note 57 infra.
,7 Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112
(1949), reprinted in 34 OKLA. L. REV. 28 (1981). In this article Professor Kuntz laid an
excellent analytical framework to aid courts in bringing order to the construction of the
words "minerals" and "surface." Under Kuntz's manner of enjoyment test, "(the
rights of the surface owner to subjacent support and his right to the use of the top-soil
in its place would have to be respected, and at the same time, the owner of the mineral
fee should have a right of extraction." 3 Wyo. L.J. at 115. This follows from the
supposed general intent of the parties that "[t]he manner of enjoyment of the mineral
estate is through extraction of valuable substances, and the enjoyment of the surface is
through retention of such substances as are necessary for the use of the surface.
3 Wyo. L.J. at 112.
11 Obviously, the intrusion of a well bore into the subsurface may interfere with
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this writer that if the well is drilled through this intervening tract
without the permission of the mineral owner, an action for
damages or an injunction should lie.59
D. Payment of Royalty From Directionally-Drilled Wells
If ABC Oil Company drills the well and production is ob-
tained, to whom must royalty be paid?
As previously discussed in the examination of bottom-hole
rights, the owner of the oil and gas in the tract in which the
well is bottomed is entitled to the production from the well.
6
0
Therefore, the owner of a nonparticipating oil royalty interest
in the surface-location tract will not be entitled to oil production
from a directional well bottomed under another tract. 6' And one
entitled to a production payment from the surface-location tract
will not be entitled to payment from production from a direc-
tional well whose surface is located on that tract but whose
producing interval is without the vertical confines of the tract.
62
Likewise, the owner of an overriding royalty interest in the lease
covering the tract where the well is surfaced is not entitled to
share in the proceeds of the directional well producing from an
adjacent tract. 63 In the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
the owner of the tract upon which the well is surfaced is not
future development by the mineral owner of the intervening tract. Such intrusion also
carries with it the constant threat of conversion of the oil and gas, as perforations for
production from the intervening tract could be made at any time. It is unlikely, however,
that the intrusion could cause subsidence or in any way harm or affect the enjoyment
of the surface estate. For these reasons, the mineral owner alone should be allowed to
grant the subsurface easement.
" But see Sadler, Subsurface Easements and Deviational Drilling, THE LANDMAN,
Sept. 1986, at 49, 55, discussing Texas law, states:
[Ilt is clear that a subsurface easement should be obtained from the surface
owner of the intervening tracts of land between the drillsite tract and the
bottom hole tract to prevent a trespass. Further . . . it may be necessary
to obtain a subsurface easement from the owner of the mineral estate, if
there has been a severance of same from the surface, in the event the drill
pipe string could damage the mineral formation beneath such tract.
This proposition that the surface owner should grant the easement is based upon the
matrix concept of subsurface ownership. See supra note 54.
61 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
61 See Pauley v. Faucett, 269 P.2d 89 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
62 See Richter v. Adams, 110 P.2d 486 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
63 See Federal Oil Co. v. Brower, 224 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1950).
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entitled to share in such production. 64 As always, close attention
should be paid to all relevant instruments. It is conceivable that
the owner of a directional well crossing subsurface boundary
lines could be liable for the payment of royalty on both the
bottom-hole tract and the surface-location tract. 65
III. SUBSURFACE TRESPASS By DIRECTIONAL DRILLING
Suppose ABC Oil Company drills the proposed .well from
the vacant tract, bottoming the well at the targeted zone under
the shopping mall. However, ABC's oil and gas lease covering
the bottom-hole tract has expired.6 What is the result?
A. Definition
"[S]ubsurface trespass ... by definition involves bottoming
of a well on the land of another without his consent, and/or
invading or intruding upon the subsurface of another's
" See WalA S & MEYERS, supra note 23, at 399.
,5 Assume that the lease covering the bottom-hole tract is the ordinary one pro-
viding for the payment of royalty on oil and gas produced from that land. Assume
further that the lease covering the surface-location tract provides for a royalty on oil
and gas produced from a well located on that tract. In such a situation, the well owner
may be faced with the obligation to make royalty payments to the royalty owners of
both tracts. 3 H. WMLIAMLS, Om AND GAS LAW § 653, at 675-76 (1986). The right of the
royalty owner of the surface-location tract to receive royalty from property in which he
has no interest would "be in the nature of a contract right or would amount to an
overriding royalty on the lessee's interest in such other tract." E. KUNTZ, supra note
26, § 11.9, at 327.
" It should be borne in mind that in cases of directional drilling, clauses typically
contained in oil and gas leases may not always offer the protection a lessee expects of
them. In A & M Oil, Inc. v. Miller, 715 P.2d 1295 (1986), the court held that a drilling
operations clause prevented a lease from terminating when the operator commenced
operations for the drilling of a directionally drilled well on the surface location tract
during the primary term, though the vertical plane of the bottom hole unit covered by
the leases was not penetrated until after the expiration of the primary term. Note that
the drilling operations clause contained in each of the three leases involved in the unit
provided, in part, that "if lessee shall commence operations for drilling at any time
while this lease is in force, this lease shall remain in force .... Id. at 1296. It seems
that a different result should obtain if the clause provided instead that an actual physical
entry upon the leased premises was required, for example, "if at the expiration of the
primary term lessee is then engaged in drilling or reworking operations on the leased
premises, this lease shall remain in force .. "
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land .... "67 When a well deviates from the vertical to the extent
that it bottoms in an adjacent tract to which the operator has
no rights, a subsurface trespass has occurred. 68 This result occurs
whether the well is a crooked well, 69 or a controlled directional
well,70 as "[a]ny unlawful physical invasion of the property of
another is a trespass." 71 Intent is immaterial to the commission
of the tort itself.
72
B. Injured Parties
The party injured by the subsurface trespass hypothesized
above is the owner of the oil and gas estate (here, the lessor of
the expired lease) under the bottom-hole tract. If XYZ Oil
Company had procured a valid top lease on the tract, it also
would be an injured party in the trespass (ABC's bottom lease
having expired). Assuming ABC's lease covering the intermediate
tract (through which the well passed but is not surfaced on or
bottomed under) does not grant the subsurface easement, the oil
and gas owner of this tract should be able to maintain a trespass
action.73
C. Proof of Subsurface Trespass
ABC Oil Company, unaware that its lease has expired, pro-
ceeds to drill its directional well with the well bottomed under
the commercially developed tract. XYZ Oil Company, which
11 Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So.2d 955, 959 (La. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 925 (1986); Recent Case, Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co.: Property Rights
- Effects of Louisiana's Oil and Gas Conservation Statute, 61 TuL. L. REV. 700 (1987).
" Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So.2d 471, 474 (La. 1943).
1 See supra note 4.
70 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
11 16 So.2d at 474.
71 Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. Mutual Oil Co., 65 P.2d 896, 898 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1937); H. WaLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 23, at 396.1. It should be noted
that trespass is, of course, an intentional tort. The trespassing driller certainly intends
to drill the well and, in the case of a controlled directional well, intends to bottom the
well under the tract in question. A trespass is committed even though one believes he is
on his own property and did not intend to invade another's property. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 74 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 164 (1965).
11 But see Sadler, supra note 59.
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now has the tract leased, has heard rumors that ABC used a
whipstock in drilling its well. XYZ has observed a decrease in
production from its well on an adjoining tract after the comple-
tion of ABC's well. XYZ Oil Company suspects that ABC's well
is bottomed under the commercially developed tract now covered
by its lease. How can it prove this?
The manifest problems with proving a subsurface trespass
by a directional well were noted soon after surveying techniques
progressed to the point of showing both angle and direction of
deviation.74 It has often been stated that a subsurface survey is
the only available means to prove a subsurface trespass. 7 In
order for a plaintiff to be able to obtain a subsurface directional
survey, there must obviously be a forum with the power to order
the survey and the plaintiff must be able to establish the facts
which tend to show that a trespass may have occurred.
1. Court's Power to Order a Subsurface Survey
The courts that have considered the issue have all found the
power to order a survey for the purpose of determining subsur-
face trespass by directional well. Some courts have declared
themselves to have the inherent power to order such a survey.
In Texas Co. v. Hollingsworth,76 the Illinois appellate court, in
a case of first impression, expressly declined to address the scope
of a particular statutev7 for such authority. Instead, the court
observed that "In our judgment a court of equity with its broad
powers for ascertaining the truth has the right to disclose the
truth in this situation. 78 The court reversed the trial court's
grant of a motion to dismiss the survey petition and remanded
the case.79 California courts have also found an inherent judicial
74 See generally Kline, supra note 1 (indicating how the "single-shot" surveying
instrument simplified and made more economical subsurface well surveying).
11 Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 215 F.2d 4, 8 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 928 (1955); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So.2d 471, 477 (La. 1943); Texas
Co. v. Hollingsworth, 27 N.E.2d 67, 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940), rev'dfor lack of necessary
parties, 31 N.E.2d 944 (Il. 1941); KUNTZ, supra note 26, § 11.9, at 328.
1- 27 N.E.2d 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940), rev'dfor lack of necessary parties, 31 N.E.2d
944 (Ill. 1941).
77 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 93, § 1 (1939).
71 Texas Co. v. Hollingsworth, 27 N.E.2d 67, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940).




power to order a subsurface survey. In Union Oil Co. v. Recon-
struction Oil Co.,8° the court noted that orders for a "sub-
survey" "were made in the exercise of the inherent power of
the court to compel the furnishing of evidence in a civil action
by one adverse party upon the proper application of the other
party."81
Other courts have found the authority to order subsurface
surveys by use of discovery rules. The Louisiana court held that
under its Code of Practice and Revised Civil Code that a trial
judge is authorized to order a directional well survey to deter-
mine whether a subsurface trespass had occurred . 2 The Texas
Supreme Court has declared that Texas courts do not have
inherent powers, at law or in equity, to order subsurface surveys
and must instead rely on written law.83 The court found such
written authority in Rule 737 of the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 4 Furthermore, federal courts have relied on Rule 34 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to order such surveys.
8 5
51 P.2d 81 (Cal. 1935) (en banc).
Id. at 83.
'2 Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So.2d 471, 478 (1943). The court relied on Article
130 giving a judge necessary power to "exercise ... their respective jurisdictions" even
though these "be not expressly given by law" and Article 442 allowing the court to
appoint experts "in order to obtain information, or at the request of parties to the suit"
of the Louisiana Code of Practice. Further reliance was placed on Article 21 of the
Revised Civil Code where "[iln all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge
is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is
to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent."
Id. at 477. See Note, Courts - Appointment of Experts - Subsurface Survey of Oil
and Gas Well, 18 TuL. L. REv. 629 (1944) (criticizing the court's reliance on Article 21
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870).
Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex. 1950).
, Id. at 393. Rule 737 provides that:
All trial courts shall entertain suits in the nature of bills of discovery, and
grant relief therein in accordance with the usages of courts of equity. Such
remedy shall be cumulative of all other remedies. In actions of such nature,
the plaintiff shall have the right to have the defendant examined on oral
interrogatories, either by summoning him to appear for examination before
the trial court as in ordinary trials, or by taking his oral deposition in
accordance with the general rules relating thereto.
TEx. RULES CIrv. PROC. 737.
', See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 175 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1949);
Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 215 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 928 (1955). Rule 34 then
provided, in part, that:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice
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An order for a subsurface directional survey is an interloc-
utory order from which an appeal will not lie.
8 6
As a precondition to obtaining a directional survey, a plain-
tiff is frequently required to post a bond to protect the defendant
from possible well bore damage arising from the survey.8 7 The
costs of the survey may be assessed against the defendant.
8
1
2. State Conservation Agency's Power to Order
a Subsurface Survey
A plaintiff may be able to obtain a well survey without
resort to the courts. The oil and gas conservation bodies of a
number of states are authorized to promulgate rules requiring
the making of directional surveys. 9 A number of the conserva-
tion agencies in the oil-and-gas-producing states have adopted
such rules.9 One such rulePt withstood challenge in L & G Oil
to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court
in which an action is pending may ... (2) order any party to permit entry
upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property
or any designated object or operation thereon....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (1948) (emphasis added). Note that Rule 34 has since been revised
to, inter alia, have the rule operate extrajudicially and eliminate the requirement of good
cause.
" Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 51 P.2d 81, 82-83 (Cal.
1935) (en banc); Texas Co. v. Hollingsworth, 27 N.E.2d 67, 70 (il. App. Ct. 1940);
Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 227 S.W.2d 317, 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), aff'd, 234
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950).
81 See Harrington v. Texaco, Inc., 339 F.2d 814, 822 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 915 (1965) (relying on Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)).
11 See Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58, 66 (W.D. Okla. 1953),
rev'd, 215 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 928 (1955); Union Oil Co. v.
Reconstruction Oil Co., 51 P.2d 81, 82 (Cal. 1935) (en banc); Texas Co. v. Hollings-
worth, 27 N.E.2d 67, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So.2d 471,
482 (La. 1943); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex. 1950). See
also Texas Statewide Rule 11, infra note 90, subsection (e)(2) of which requires the
posting of a bond in a sum to be determined by the Railroad Commission as security
against all costs and risks associated with the survey.
89 See SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 82, at 276 n.31.
o Id.
91 Texas Statewide Rule 54, § V. Rule 11, which replaced Rule 54, provides in
subsection (e), in part, that:
The Commission, at the written request of any operator in a field, shall
determine whether a directional survey, an inclination survey, or any other
[VOL. 4:235
1988-89] DIREcTIoNAL DRILLING
Co. v. Railroad Commission.9 2 The court held that the Texas
Railroad Commission was empowered to promulgate and enforce
rules for the making of subsurface well surveys without seeking
court approval. 93 Such an order was within the power delegated
to the Commission by the State Legislature 94 and this was found
not to require prior notice and hearing. 95 An alleged failure of
the Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation to enforce the
Louisiana rule9 providing for directional surveys does not allow
the plaintiff, in an action against the suspected trespasser, from
seeking an independent right to a court order requiring the
defendant to submit to such a survey. Instead, the plaintiff,
after exhausting any administrative remedies, must initiate suit
against the Commissioner challenging the Commissioner's action
(or inaction).
97
type of survey approved by the Commission for the purpose of determining
bottom hole location of wells, shall be made in regard to a well complained
of in the same field.
5. Nothing in these rules shall be construed to prevent or limit the Com-
mission, acting on its own authority, in conducting spot checks and surveys
at any time and place for the purpose of determining compliance with
Commission rules and regulations.
92 368 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1963).
91 Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 192.
91 Id. at 194. The trial court's judgment denying an injunction against the enforce-
ment of the Commission's order was reversed, however, because the Commission's order
had been improperly drawn to allow the plaintiff, rather than the Commission, to make
the survey. Id. at 195-96.
" LOUISIANA STATEWIDE ORDER No. 29-B, which provided, in part, that
All new wells that have surface locations 300 feet more or less from any
property or unit line and that reach a depth of 4,000 feet or more shall,
beginning with the effective date of this order, have directional surveys
made to the total depth of the hole before setting final string of casing.
Guarisco v. Trahan, 173 So.2d 304, 305 (La. Ct. App. 1965), writ refused, 176 So.2d
143 (1965) (quoting Order No. 29-B). Louisiana Department of Conservation State-Wide
Order No. 29-B, in Section XVIII (3), presently provides that a directional survey is to
be conducted if (a) a well is directionally controlled and thereby intentionally deflected
from the vertical; (b) the surface location is less than 330 feet from the nearest property
line and the well is drilled deeper than 3,786 feet; (c) the resultant lateral deviation as
calculated from inclination survey data is a distance greater than the distance from the
surface location to the nearest property line; or (d) the well bore deviates laterally a
resultant distance greater than that determined by a five (5) degree angle from a vertical
line passing through the center of the surface location of the well bore.
11 Guarisco v. Trahan, 173 So.2d 304 (La. Ct. App. 1965), writ refused, 176 So.2d
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3. Plaintiff's Burden of Showing a Reasonable
Probability of Trespass
Assuming the plaintiff has a forum that is empowered to
order the survey, will the issuance of the order be automatic?
To the contrary, normally the plaintiff must have reason to
believe that a subsurface trespass has occurred and be able to
support his suspicions with objective proof.98 Among the types
of evidence that will place the plaintiff over this objective-
proof treshold are:
1. the use of deviational tools by the defendant in drilling
the well; m°°
2. the fact that the suspect well has a surface location close
to plaintiff's boundary line; I0 '
143 (La. 1965). Although the order requires a directional survey ("shall-... have
directional surveys made," supra note 95), the Commissioner in this case accepted instead
a "computed survey run in combination with a dip meter survey .. 173 So.2d at
305.
[I]f the adjoining landowner can show that there is a probability that
his land has been invaded, intentionally or otherwise, under Rule 34 he is
entitled to a survey to aid him in establishing that fact.
[When once the probability of trespass is shown, then the court is not
only justified in ordering a temporary invasion of the property of a
defendant, but it has the duty to do so.
As to the likelihood of trespass it goes without saying that the court should
not require that measure of proof which would be needed to establish the
fact of trespass at a trial on the merits, since if such proof could be made
there would be no need for the sought after evidence; however, there must
be a showing of probability as distinguished from afar removed possibility.
Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58, 63-64 (W.D. Okla. 1953) (emphasis in
the original), rev'd, 215 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 928 (1955). The
trial court's judgment was reversed since the plaintiff had not met his burden. 215 F.2d
at 6. The appellate court pronounced that "Itihe moving party is not entitled as a matter
of right to an order for the making of such a survey. Under the rule, it is incumbent
upon the party applying for the order to make a showing of good cause." Id.
" See also H. WffLIAMS & C. MEYERs, supra note 23, at 398; Note, Oil and Gas
- Deviation of Wells From the Vertical - Liability for Subsurface Trespass, 16 TEX.
L. REv. 543, 545 (1938).
'0 See Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 66 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1937); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 390-91 (Tex. 1950).
-o Union Oil Co., 66 P.2d at 1216 (sixty feet from the boundary line of plaintiff's
lease); Texas Co. v. Hollingsworth, 27 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Il1. App. Ct. 1940) (nine wells
drilled on a six to thirty-three-foot wide strip by a rotary rig); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co.,
16 So.2d 471, 473 (La. 1943) (defendant's well within thirty-three feet of minimum
spacing distance-300 feet-from plaintiff's well).
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3. statements by defendant that tend to show an improper
deviation;102
4. a sudden drop in production from plaintiff's well; 03
5. dry or uneconomic holes previously drilled on defen-
dant's tract;'04
6. subsurface structures that would tend to indicate plain-
tiff's tract should be more geologically promising than
defendant's;105
7. the fact that defendant's well bore is significantly greater
in length than the known depth of the formation from
which defendant is purportedly producing;106 and
8. a deviational (but not directional) survey performed which
indicates sufficient deviation that if all the deviation were
in one direction, the well could be bottomed under plain-
tiff's property. 0 7
D. Remedy for Subsurface Trespass
XYZ Oil Company obtains a directional survey which proves
that ABC Oil Company has committed subsurface trespass by
bottoming ABC's well under XYZ's tract. Assume that no pro-
duction has yet been obtained from the well. What remedies are
available to XYZ?
1. Damages
At common law, a suit for damages would always lie for a
trespass. 0 The action of trespass quare clausum fregit afforded
' See Union Oil Co., 66 P.2d at 1218.
03 See Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So.2d 471, 474-75 (La. 1943) (plaintiff's well
"went dead").
,1 See Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex. 1950) (plaintiff
had, under former lease, drilled three uneconomic wells on defendant's tract). But cf.
Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58, 65 (W.D. Okla. 1953) (plaintiff's tract
had been proved to be a poor producer by a former, lackluster well located thereon),
rev'd, 215 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 928 (1955).
,05 See Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex. 1950) (plaintiff's
tract "up-dip" from defendant's tract).
,o See Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. at 64.
'1' See Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 215 F.2d 4, 7 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 928 (1955).
"I Every unauthorized intrusion into the land of another is sufficient trespass
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the plaintiff compensation to the extent of the injury to his
property. 19 If the plaintiff could show no actual damages, nom-
inal damages would be awarded." 0
In the scenario posed, if the well has not produced (even
though capable of producing in commercial quantities), XYZ
Oil Company may only be entitled to nominal damages in a
trespass action for damages. The right to compensatory damages
hinges upon the ability of the oil and gas owner or lessee to
prove actual damages of either a temporary or permanent na-
ture."' Unless it can be shown that a nonproducing well bore
causes some actual damage by its mere presence in the plaintiff's
subsurface, it appears unlikely that compensatory damages would
be awarded. This is so because the measure of damages for a
trespass causing permanent injuries is the difference in the value
of the property before and after the trespass, or, expressed in
another way, the diminution in the market vaule of the prop-
erty." 2 Unless the nonproducing well bore is causing some dam-
to support an action for breaking the close. It is immaterial to the cause
of action that no actual injury is done. . . . His legal right being invaded
by the intrusion, he is entitled at least to nominal damages in order to
vindicate that right and recover his costs. When the plaintiff's land is
illegally entered a cause of action at once arises....
4 J. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 1010, at 3736-37 (4th ed. 1916). Accord 3
T. SEDOWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 923, at 1898-99 (9th ed. 1912).
,o' See SEDOGWICK, supra note 108, § 932, at 1916.
10 Id. at n.83. See also Note, What Is The Proper Remedy in the Slant-Hole Suit?,
18 Sw. L.J. 486 (1964).
Because a trespass action rests upon a violation of the right of exclusive
possession, the physical intrusion of a well bore into the tract of another
constitutes a trespass regardless of whether production is obtained. The
drilling is the essential element of the cause of action; drainage is not
necessary. However, the owner is entitled only to nominal damages for
mere intrusion without further injury; it is necessary to prove that drainage
has occurred in order to obtain compensatory damages.
Id. at 487 (emphasis in the original).
- Even absent production, damage may occur to the oil and gas owner or lessee
through damage caused to the producible stratum by: the negligent "shooting" of a well
with nitroglycerin; the negligent acidation of the structure; the introduction of air into
the stratum, thereby reducing the effect of vacuum pumps; and by reason of the
migration of salt water or some other substance into the stratum. See H. WELLIAmS &
C. MEYEas, supra note 23, § 207.7, and the cases cited therein. Too, the intrusion of
the well bore could interfere with future development of the tract by the rightful oil and
gas owner.
,,2 SEDGWICK, supra note 108, § 932, at 1916.
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ages to the oil and gas estate, it would seem that a compensatory
award would not be appropriate. Of course, the plaintiff might
be able to make out a case for punitive damages in the case of
a willful trespass. Whatever right to damages the owner of the
bottom-hole tract could claim, the owner of the intervening tract
should also recover in a trespass action.
2. Injunction
Because of the inadequacy of a suit for damages for trespass,
XYZ Oil Company has determined that it would prefer to enjoin
ABC Oil Company's operation of the trespassing well. May it
do so?
It seems clear that XYZ is entitled to such an injunction. In
Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate,"' the court
held that an injunction should be granted to stop such a tres-
pass." 4 Another interesting California case finding a right to an
injunction was Union Oil Co. v. Domengeaux.1" 5 In this case,
the oil and gas lessees of intervening tracts (but not the lessee
of the bottom-hole tract) sought an injunction against the parties
who had drilled a directional well through their tracts. 1 6 The
injunction issued by the trial court was affirmed. Although the
plaintiffs in Domengeaux had been able to establish a case of
drainage,"7 it seems clear that an injunction would have been
permitted regardless." 8
113 76 P.2d 167 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
- Id. at 176.
86 P.2d 127 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
36 According to an attorney involved in the case:
The surface surveys of the well in question demonstrated that only 432
feet of the well's total depth of approximately 4200 feet existed within the
defendant's lands. The evidence showed that the well invaded and passed
through five additional properties and was "bottomed" with a horizontal
drift of more than 1425 feet from its surface location, but within a
leasehold estate of a corporation not party plaintiff in the action which
was instituted. The defendants proved that no portion of the producing
interval of the well was within the plaintiff's leasehold estates.
Kline, supra note 1, at 38.
86 P.2d at 129.
IS The court stated:
[Defendants] contend that even assuming that they were chargeable with
trespassing, the damages were "too trifling and inconsequential" to justify
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The wrongful intrusion of the well bore into plaintiff's prop-
erty is governed by the doctrine that a mineral trespass, even
without a removal of minerals, is irreparable in and of itself and
should be enjoined." 9 Further, even without production, the
existence of the well bore, unplugged, in plaintiff's property
might eventually amount to a prescriptive easement running in
favor of the trespasser. 120 For this reason the right to an injunc-
tion is important to both the bottom-hole and intervening tract
owners where a subsurface trespass has occurred.
3. Speculative Damages for the Drilling of a Dry Hole
Assume that, before the drilling of the deviated well, XYZ
Oil Company had been approached for an assignment of its
lease. The interested party had offered $25,000 for the assign-
ment. XYZ was giving serious thought to the offer when it was
discovered that ABC Oil Company's dry hole had actually tres-
passed into and was bottomed under XYZ's lease. No longer
the granting of injunctive relief. It appears to be defendants' theory that
an injunction will issue only upon a showing of irreparable injury. In this
connection, defendants entirely ignore the testimony showing that their
well, after trespassing upon the property of the several plaintiffs, was
bottomed at a point where it was producing oil from the property of
plaintiff Union Oil Company. But even in the absence of such showing,
we are still of the opinion that there is no merit in said contention. The
trespass here was a subsurface trespass in an oil and gas producing area....
It has heretofore been held in a case involving a subsurface trespass by
way of tunneling that "the injury is irreparable in itself."
Id. at 130 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
"I See, e.g., Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 397-98 (Tex. 1950)
(rejecting defendants' contention that temporary injunction was premature because well
had not been completed as a producer and the only possible damage due to the
penetration of plaintiffs' subsurface was damage to the lateral support). Accord Chevron
Oil Co. v. Howell, 407 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also 1 J. HiGH,
LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 730, at 470-71 (2nd ed. 1880); 5 3. POMEROY, EQuITABLE REMEDIES
§ 1909 at 4329-30 (2nd ed. 1919); Kline, supra note 1, at 37. But see dicta in Union Oil
Co. v. Domengeaux, 86 P.2d 127, 130 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (observing that a slight
penetration into and back out of plaintiff's property might not warrant injunctive relief).
"I See Union Oil Co. v. Domengeaux, 86 P.2d 127, 130 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939);
Kline, supra note 1, at 37. "Prescriptive easements are based on the notion that if one
uses the property of another for a certain period without permission and the owner fails
to prevent such use, the prolonged usage should be treated as conclusive evidence that
the use is by right." J. BRUCE & J. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN
LAND 1 5.01 (1988).
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interested, the third party withdraws its offer to purchase the
lease. Does XYZ Oil Company have any remedies other than a
suit in trespass for nominal damages or an injunction to have
the hole plugged?
In Kishi v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. ,121 Kishi, the plaintiff,
was the owner of a three-fourths undivided interest in the oil
and gas under a 50-acre tract. Kishi and the cotenant owning
the other one-fourth interest leased the tract to Humble Oil &
Refining Company. After the expiration of the lease, a produc-
ing oil well was drilled on an adjoining tract. The next day,
Humble, believing its lease to still be valid, entered onto Kishi's
tract and began drilling. Kishi protested although his cotenant,
apparently also believing the lease to be in force, acquiesced.
22
Because of the productive well recently drilled, bonus offers for
leases had been generous in the area. Humble's drilling opera-
tions on Kishi's tract resulted in a dry hole. Following this,
obviously, it was unlikely that Kishi could have leased his interest
for any bonus payment. Kishi sued to recover the value of the
bonus payment that he could have received had the defendant
not wrongfully drilled the dry hole.
The trial court found for the plaintiff, but awarded only one
dollar as nominal damages. Although the trial court found as a
matter of fact that Kishi may well have been able to lease his
property based upon a bonus of $1,000 per acre, it concluded
that "it is not believed that possible profits so highly speculative,
remote, and contingent could be allowed .... ,123 The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals found this to be error, holding that Kishi
was entitled to compensation for the market value of the lease-
hold rights, but that such value should be shown by actual
opportunities to lease and actual bonuses offered. 24 The Texas
"1 261 S.W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), rev'd, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. Com. App.
1925), on rehearing, 291 S.W. 538 (Tex. Com. App. 1927); Recent Case, 5 TEX. L. Rv.
322 (1927).
"2 Note that Humble was evidently within its rights in being on the property since
it ostensibly had the consent of Kishi's cotenant. However, Humble committed a trespass
against Kishi by denying Kishi's right to possession for exploratory purposes and by
claiming those exclusive rights in itself by virtue of the expired lease. See Kishi, 261
S.W. at 231.
123 Id.
" Id. at 232-33.
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Commission of Appeals reversed this holding, finding that proof
of the market value (rather that actual offers or opportunities
to lease) of the leasing right was a sufficient legal basis for
judgment. An award of $37,500 (that is, 3/4ths interest x $1,000/
acre x 50 acres) was granted. 25 This award was later set aside
by the Commission of Appeals, inasmuch as a prevailing lease
bonus of $1,000 per acre might not extend to one owning less
than the entire oil and gas estate.126 The case was remanded for
a determination of the leasing value of Kishi's three-fourths
interest.
27
Soon after Kishi, a similar case, Martel v. Hall Oil Co.,' 21
reached the Wyoming Supreme Court. Hall Oil Company was
the assignee of an oil and gas lease granted by Martel's prede-
cessor in title. Martel received, by warranty deed, the oil and
gas under the tract covered by the lease. The oil company's
agent entered onto the premises and commenced drilling opera-
tions despite the objection of Martel and his predecessor. The
drilling resulted in a dry hole. The drilling of the well had been
prosecuted during the pendency of an action seeking lease can-
cellation. That case resulted in Hall Oil Company's lease being
cancelled and damages for trespass to the surface being awarded
to the surface owner. 1
29
Although it seems that the basis of the suit in Martel was
for recovery of the lost leasing opportunity (by virtue of the oil
company's dry hole trespass). The court treated it as a "dispar-
agement of property" case. The court reasoned that slander of
title would not lie in the absence of a falsehood, and no false-
hood could be found in Hall's revealing the true state of affairs
concerning Martel's property: that no oil or gas was to be found
thereunder. The court further found Martel's claim of damages
"highly speculative." 30 (Martel had offered evidence of bonus
value of from $25 to $265 per acre in a field one-half mile from
his property. The nearest producing well was some two miles
,25 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190, 191 (Tex. Com. App. 1925).
'u Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 291 S.W. 538, 539 (Tex. Com. App. 1927).
IZ2 ld. at 539.
253 P. 862 (Wyo.), reh'g denied, 255 P. 3 (Wyo. 1927).
129 Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 237 P. 255, 270 (Wyo. 1925).
110 253 P. at 864.
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away from his tract.) The court, specifically rejecting Kishi,13 '
adjudged Martel to be entitled to nominal damages only.
While there is middle ground between the positions taken in
Kishi and Martel,13 2 this writer offers the position of the Texas
court in Kishi as the more equitable.'33 A bonus payment for
the grant of a lease on a landowner's property is often viewed
by that landowner as being second in value only to his royalty
interest. In areas of particular promise, offers for the purchase
of a lease can be quite high. If a landowner's leasing privilege
is rendered worthless by the act of a trespasser, the wrongdoer
should answer by making the landowner whole. It is submitted
that the landowner should not be denied full compensation
because of the lack of a specific offer or difficulty in proving
damages with a high degree of exactitude.
134
"' For an interesting discussion attempting to distinguish Martel from Kishi, see
Note, Another Look at the Martel Case, 11 Wyo. L.J. 109, 110 (1957) (noting that
Martel's property was approximately two miles from the nearest producing well while a
well was producing only 150 feet from Kishi's property, and that there was no apparent
"market" for leases in Martel's area while bonus prices were quite high in the immediate
vicinity of Kishi's tract).
"I See H. W.LIas & C. MEYERS, supra note 23, § 229, at 404-09 (proposing that
in a suit for loss of speculative value, recovery should be limited to those situations
where a dry hole trespass has occurred on the plaintiff's land, not on an adjacent tract,
and that proof be made of an actual offer to lease or assign the property).
So too, apparently, did the court in Matheson v. Placid Oil Co., 33 So.2d 527,
531 (La. 1947) (landowners were awarded damages in the amount of the value of the
assignment of an expired lease where the assignee of that lease trespassed by drilling a
dry hole on the property). Cf. American Sur. Co. of New York v. Marsh, 293 P. 1041
(Okla. 1930) (Marsh, a lessee, recovered damages for the lost opportunity to assign his
valid lease following the drilling of a dry hole on adjacent land when a lessee prior in
time to Marsh stayed in possession under his expired lease pending a determination of
the validity of the two leases) and Hunt Oil Co. v. Berry, 86 So.2d 7, modified on other
grounds, 86 So.2d 854 (Miss. 1956) (holding that Berry was allowed to recover the
amount of a bonus offer made before the drilling of a dry hole nearby when the offer
was withdrawn due to the recordation of a lease amendment which wrongfully indicated
the property to be held by another lease; however, Berry was not allowed any recovery
on other land where he had received no bonus offer, even though its leasing value had
been severely depreciated by the dry hole).
1 For commentary that generally supports the Kishi holding, see V. KULP, OIL
AND GAS RIGHTS 533-34 (1954); Castleberry, supra note 7, at 298-301; Qualls, Damages
for Dry Hole Trespass, 40 N.D.L. REV. 65 (1964); Walker, Fee Simple Ownership of
Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEx. L. REv. 125, 132-38 (1928); and Note, Real Property:
Trespass to Land: Appropriation of Right to Drill for Oil: Measure of Damages, 11
CORNELL L. Q. 416 (1926). Kishi has also received its share of criticism. See SUMMERS,
supra note 19, § 25; Note, What Protection Has a Landowner Against a Trespass Which
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY [VOL. 4:235
IV. CONVERSION By PRODUCTION FROM ILLEGALLY-
DRILLED DIRECTIONAL WELL
Suppose that ABC Oil Company has produced oil from the
well improperly bottomed under XYZ Oil Company's lease tract
before XYZ discovers the trespass. Does a cause of action lie
for this removal of the oil?
A. Definition
"[C]onversion of personal property takes place wherever a
person who is neither the owner nor entitled to the possession
exercises dominion or control over it inconsistent with or in
defiance of the rights of a person who is either in possession or
entitled to the immediate possession."' 35 Of course, the tort of
conversion does not apply to real estate. 36 However, the sever-
Merely Destroys the Speculative Value of His Property?, 4 TEx. L. REv. 215 (1926);
Note, Damages in Oil and Gas Cases, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 631, 632; Note, Damages for
Exploration Trespasses in the Oil Fields, 48 HARv. L. REv. 485 (1935); Comment, Loss
of Speculative Value Caused by Disclosure of Unknown Facts, 36 YALE L.J. 1167 (1927).
It has been suggested that a landowner is not even made whole by a recovery such as
that received by Kishi. Though the landowner recovers the lost bonus (the value of the
grant of the exclusive drilling privilege), he still has not been compensated for the value
of his royalty interest. Lessors can receive a considerable sum of money by selling their
royalty interest, or a part thereof, even prior to any operations on the property. Walker,
supra, at 136-37. As to the issue of damages being too speculative, it seems that Professor
McCormick laid down the better position in recommending recovery despite the lack of
certainty in proof:
One common motive actuating purchasers is the desire of holding the
property for a speculation on the hazard of a rise in value. This speculative
attractiveness, though occasionally frowned upon, seems properly recog-
nized as a factor to be considered in determining market value; that is, the
amount that a purchaser could have been induced to pay. Likewise, if a
high price for the property could actually have been secured at the time in
question, this should be accounted its then market value, however sudden
this rise may have been or however much it may have been due to baseless
rumors ....
C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 44, at 168-69 (1935) (footnotes omitted). See
also, 25 C.J.S. Damages § 28 (1966).
"I R. BOWERS, THE LAW OF CONVERSION § 1, at 2 (1917). Another definition is:
"Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so
seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be
required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 222A.(1) (1965).
' PROSSER, supra note 72, § 15, at 81; 89 C.J.S. Trover& Conversion § 11 (1955).
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ance of a mineral from the earth changes the mineral from realty
to personal property, 37 at which time the mineral is subject to
conversion.'3 8
B. Injured Parties
One obvious injured party in a subsurface trespass by direc-
tional well is the owner or lessee of the oil and gas in the
bottom-hole tract.'3 9 The owner of an oil payment may also be
entitled to recover for such a trespass.' 40 A lessor or royalty
owner entitled to a share of the proceeds of production may
also maintain an action for conversion.1
4'
,17 J. SCHOULER, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 4 (5th ed. 1918). "A mineral
or metal in the earth is real property; but dig out the precious substance, and you have
an article of merchandise, which is personal property." Id. at 4.
Rock, gravel and ore, while remaining in their original state where
nature put them are not personal property, but are a part of the realty
and of course are not subject to be converted unless removed from their
bed. But their wrongful removal, even through an honest mistake, will
constitute a conversion for which trover will lie.
BOWERS, supra note 135, § 33, at 24-25.
,"I See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. See also Union Oil Co. of
California v. Mutual Oil Co., 65 P.2d 896, 899 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
", Bardeen v. Commander Oil Co., 104 P.2d 875 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940) (the
owner of an oil payment entitled to recover in a contract action from an operator who
had, in turn, recovered from another for oil converted from the premises by means of
two slant wells).
M See Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167, 176 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1938). A traditional view of conversion would not allow one with a
nonpossessory interest (for example, a royalty owner) to maintain the action. See
Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.) (applying Oklahoma
law), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Comment, Oil and Gas: Liability and Damages
for Underground Trespasses, 27 CALF. L. Rav. 192, 199-200 (1939); Note, supra note
110, at 487-88; 89 C.J.S. Trover & Conversion § 72 (1955). It has been written that as
to a payment-in-kind lessor in Texas that:
[A]ny dispositon of the royalty oil by the lessee, or by the purchaser of
the production from the well, without the lessor's consent constitutes a
conversion....
On the other hand, where the royalty is payable in money, title to all of
the production is in the lessee. The lessor's claim for the accrued royalty
payment is apparently only an unsecured debt.
Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas,
10 TEx. L. REV. 291, 301 (1932) (footnotes omitted). Should the right to maintain an
action in conversion be limited to those royalty owners entitled to take production in
kind? It is submitted that the right should not be so limited. It seems that the payment-
in-money lessor should be fully protected by allowing him the right to proceed against
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C. Liable Parties
A number of parties may be liable for the conversion of oil
and gas by directional well. Among them:
1. the working-interest owners of the well;
42
2. the officers of a corporation which drills such a well 43
and the corporation itself;'44
3. one who receives a production payment;
45
4. a trust, its trustees and beneficiaries;' 46
5. a bank or financing institution; 47 and
6. a purchasing pipeline. 48
One case held an operator jointly liable (with his nonoper-
ating co-lessees) for all oil converted from an illegal directional
well, not just for the portion attributable to his share of the
the trespasser. One can conceive of a case in which the lessee (the one entitled to
possession) might fail to prosecute the action, while the lessor would be virtually without
a remedy if the lessee is judgment-proof or near insolvency. See Note, Suing a Slant-
Driller for Subsurface Trespass or Drainage, 15 STAN. L. REv. 665, 666-67 (1963) (states
the proposition that not only lessors but other royalty owners should be able to maintain
a conversion suit). Note that the royalty owners in the A. E. Bell case were apparently
payment-in-kind lessors. See 76 P.2d at 179.
"I See Edwards v. Lachman, 534 P.2d 670, 670 (Okla. 1974); Harrington v. Texaco,
Inc., 339 F.2d 814, 817 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
,,1 See Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 66 P.2d 1215, 1218,
1223 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
'" See Pacific W. Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 81 P.2d 207, 209 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1938). Cf. Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. Mutual Oil Co., 65 P.2d 896, 897 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1937) (the court found here the defendant corporation acted as an agent for the
individual defendants in the production and sale of petroleum).
"I Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 66 P.2d at 1218 (driller partly com-
pensated by production payment held liable for conversion).
1, Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 116 P.2d 786 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1941). "[A] fiduciary trust estate may be required to respond in damages for
the trustee's tortious act to the extent that the estate has been enriched by such act."
Id. at 788.
14' See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Long, 340 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 926 (1965). It was held in this case that the financing institution could
be held liable for conversion because of the substantial control the institution exerted
over the property, even though it was unaware of the fact that the wells were illegally
deviated. The institution's control came from the elaborate convenants it placed in its
deeds of trust (including the right to take over operation of the well) and assignments
of runs through deeds of trusts and division orders.
,,1 See Dau & Ratliff, Pipeline and Lender Liability for Slant-Hole Production, 43
TEx. L. REv. 772 (1965).
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working interest. 49 The Texas court has found a well service
company not to be a participant in a conspiracy to defraud a
good faith purchaser of illegally deviated wells. 50 This was true
even though the service company took calculated steps, designed
to protect its customers, which had the effect of helping conceal
the illegal nature of the wells.' 1 The court found that the evi-
dence did not lead to a "reasonable inference" that the well
service company had actual knowledge of the illegal deviation
or that it had intended to participate in any wrong.15 2 It has also
been held, however, that a well surveying company which vio-
lates a nondisclosure provision of its contract in order to notify
a third party that the surveying company's customer has wrong-
fully deviated a well into the third party's tract will not be held
liable for breach of contract. 53 In another case, recovery was
denied in a suit brought by the good faith purchaser of improp-
erly-deviated wells against its insurance company. 5 4 The insured
had been forced to settle two conversion suits and sued the
insurance company for an indemnification under the property
damage liability policy. The court found that the policy coverage
was for property damage and not conversion. 55
,49 Harrington v. Texaco, Inc., 339 F.2d 814, 819 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 915 (1965). It should be noted that the court explicitly pointed out that the question
as to whether the nonoperating working-interest owners should also be held jointly liable
for all converted oil was not before the court. Id. at n.9.
I" Schlumberger Well Sur. Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854
(Tex. 1968). The service company, which had logged and perforated a great many
directional wells, developed a billing system that would not reflect the actual depth of
the well, advised its employees to have poor memories, and destroyed certain logs.
I Id. at 856.
512 Id. at 857. The court stated that no evidence had been produced that showed
that the service company knew of the location of lease boundary lines or had reason to
believe that the wells were not directional wells located within their own lease lines, or
bottomed within a tract owned by its customers. Id.
"I Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1972). The
contract was held to be enforceable, but the circumstances demanded "public policy to
intervene to prevent enforcement of all of the silence." Id. at 854.
' " Nortex Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 456 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970).
" Id. at 493-94. "The insurer did not contract to indemnify the insured for
disgorging that to which it was not entitled in the first place, or for being deprived of
profits to which it was not entitled." Id. at 494.
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D. Remedy
The remedy in an action for conversion for the removal of
oil or gas from an illegally-drilled directional well is damages.
The general rule as to the measure of recovery for conversion is
the value of the property converted at the time of conversion,
with interest. 56 In cases of conversion of minerals where the
defendant enters onto plaintiff's property, severs and converts
the mineral product, the measure of damages is the full value
of the converted mineral at the time and place converted; how-
ever, if the defendant can show that he was a "good faith
trespasser," he will be allowed deductions for certain expenses
to the extent that they benefited the plaintiff.
5 7
The rules concerning the measure of recovery in cases of
subsurface mineral trespass are the same as those in ordinary
mineral trespass cases. Thus in Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction
Oil Co.,"' involving a subsurface trespass by directional well,
the appellate court found that the trial court had applied the
proper measure of damages by awarding plaintiff the gross
amount received by defendants from the sale of oil and gas,
without any deductions for costs of production, where it was
found that defendant had committed a deliberate and intentional
trespass. 159
In Edwards v. Lachman, 60 the defendants drilled and placed
on line a well that was completed to two separate formations.
Seven months later, after obtaining a directional survey, defen-
dants discovered that their well was bottomed under plaintiffs'
tract; however, they did not inform plaintiffs of this. Plaintiffs
subsequently drilled a well on their own tract which was com-
pleted in the shallower of the two formations from which defen-
dants' well was producing. The plaintiffs sued for an accounting
and the court found that while the defendants may have been
516 R. BOWERS, supra note 135, § 630, at 459. See also 89 C.J.S. Trover &
Conversion § 163 (1955).
17 See generally Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167,
174 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938); H. WiLiAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 23, at § 226; W.
SUMMERS, supra note 19, §§ 23-24; Castleberry, supra note 7, at 281-90.
58 66 P.2d 1215 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937).
"9 Id. at 1222.
534 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1974).
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good faith trespassers until the directional survey was conducted,
thereafter their silence and continued production negatived any
finding of good faith. 16' And although the defendants would
ordinarily be entitled to deduct their expenses as good faith
trespassers (until the date of the survey), in order to do so their
expenditures must have benefited the plaintiffs.
162
The court noted that as the plaintiffs' own well would pre-
sumably drain the formation in which both wells had been
completed, the defendants were not entitled to costs attributable
to that production. As to production from the deeper formation,
however, the court held that defendants were entitled to credit
their costs of drilling, completing and equipping the well to the
extent that it could be shown that plaintiffs were benefited
thereby. 163 Interest on the illegal production was held appropri-
ate. 164
The court then remanded the case for a determination of the
extent to which defendants' well conferred benefits upon the
plaintiffs prior to the time of the directional survey. On a later
appeal, 165 the court held that the trial court's judgment awarding
a credit to the defendants for the cost of drilling from the
shallower zone (where both the plaintiffs' and defendants' wells
produced) to the deeper zone (from which plaintiffs' well did
not produce) was proper. 166 The defendants were not allowed
the cost of drilling their well to total depth (that is, below the
deeper producing zone) as no information beneficial to plaintiffs
was derived thereby.
167
Of course, the measure of recovery for conversion may be




161 Id. at 677.
162 Id. at 675.
,61 Id. at 676.
' Id. at 677.
5 Edwards v. Lachman, 567 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1977).
Id. at 76.
167 Id.
"6 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 31.30.010 (1985) (measure for "good faith" conversion
is the value of the oil or gas at the time of extraction, without interest, after deducting
all costs of development, operation, and production; costs include taxes and interest on
expenditures); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 349 3/4 (West 1982) (provides the same remedy
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E. Procedural Issues
As for venue, a Texas court found that for a case involving
conversion from an improperly-deviated well, the venue will lie
in the county in which the well is located, despite the fact that
none of the defendants reside in that county. 169 It has also been
held that where a plaintiff has prayed for an injunction for
trespass and an accounting of damages for conversion, the de-
fendant is entitled to a trial by jury on the issue of damages.
70
However, refusal of a defendant's demand for a jury may be a
nonprejudicial error if a jury could have returned no other
verdict than that found by the trial judge.
17'
F. Statutes of Limitation
Assume ABC Oil Company illegally bottoms its directional
well under XYZ Oil Company's tract. ABC keeps secret its use
of deflectional drilling tools and its own directional survey show-
ing the improper deviation. XYZ does not learn of the subsur-
face trespass and conversion for four years. If the jurisdiction
has a two-year statute of limitations for conversion actions, will
XYZ Oil Company's recovery be limited to that period?
A plaintiff bringing an action for conversion of oil or gas
may expect to find that his recovery will be limited by a statute
of limitations. For example, in a case where a plaintiff sued a
crude oil purchaser for conversion, instituting the suit some
thirteen months after the last purchase of the oil, the court held
the plaintiff barred by a one-year statute of limitations. 172 Fur-
thermore, where a trespasser produced oil some four years before
as the Alaska statute); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 64 (West 1987) (at the option of the
injured party, value of the property at the time of conversion with interest from that
time or, if the action is prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the highest market value
of the property at any time between the conversion and the verdict, without interest).
10 Powell v. Forest Oil Corp., 392 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
170 Pacific W. Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 87 P.2d 1045, 1050 (Cal. 1939) (en banc).
" See id. at 1050-51. Pacific W. overruled the court in Union Oil Co. v. Recon-
struction Oil Co., 66 P.2d 1215 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937), to the effect that in an
instance where the legal issue (damages) is considered incidental to the equitable issue
(an injunction), the defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to a trial by jury. Id.
at 1050.
,72 Martin v. Texas Co., 90 So. 922, 923 (La. 1921).
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plaintiff brought its action, the court limited the plaintiff's re-
covery to the value of the oil converted during the two-year
period prior to the filing of the suit.173
While the statute of limitations will normally begin to run
when the conversion takes place, a different rule generally ap-
plies in the case of subsurface mineral trespass. Because of the
obvious difficulty in discovering an underground trespass, it has
been often held that the statute of limitations will be tolled until
the trespass is actually discovered or, with reasonable diligence,
should have been discovered.'
74
In Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Orr,175 the plain-
tiff sued for the value of oil and gas produced by the defendants
from two wells deviated so as to bottom under plaintiff's tract.
The plaintiff attempted to have the two-year statute of limita-
tions tolled due to plaintiff's lack of actual knowledge of the
subsurface trespass and conversion and because the defendant
had fraudulently concealed the tortious nature of its activity.
76
In rejecting the plaintiff's request to have the statute tolled, the
court found that the plaintiff did not meet the "required stan-
dard of diligence" in discovering the trespass and conversion.
77
,71 Marathon Oil Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 130 S.W.2d 365, 375-76 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939), modified on other grounds, 152 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1941).
"I E.g., Falls Branch Coal Co. v. Proctor Coal Co., 262 S.W. 300, 304-06 (Ky.
1924) (in an underground trespass where coal was severed from plaintiff's property and
converted, the five-year statute of limitations was tolled until actual discovery). It is
sometimes stated that the very nature of a subsurface trespass amounts to a fraudulent
concealment which suspends the running of the statute of limitations. See Dau & Ratliff,
supra note 148, at 787-88; Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run
Against Action to Recover, or for Conversion of, Property Stolen or Otherwise Wrong-
fully Taken, 136 A.L.R. 658 (1942); Annotation, When Limitation Begins to Run Against
an Action to Recover on Account of Removal of Mineral from Land, 37 A.L.R. 1182
(1925).
7 319 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963).
176 It appears that the defendant had a directional survey performed which indicated
that no trespass had occurred. This information was made available to the plaintiff.
Following the survey, the defendant evidently continued drilling and deflected the bore
hole to the extent that it bottomed under plaintiff's tract. The plaintiff contended that
it had assumed that drilling was completed when the survey was conducted. Id. at 615.
,17 Id. at 617. The court noted that the plaintiff's own geologist had sent a letter
to the plaintiff shortly after the completion of defendant's well which clearly raised the
question of the well possibly having been "whipstocked" into the plaintiff's tract. Id.
at 616.
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In Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Long,7 ' the
plaintiffs sued the operator and working interest owners and the
institution which had financed four wells which were deviated
to bottom under plaintiffs' tracts. The appellate court affirmed
the lower court's finding that the statute of limitations should
be tolled as to the operator and working interest owners by
reason of fraudulent concealment. As to the financing institu-
tion, however, recovery for the value of the converted oil was
limited to the statutory two-year period, as the institution had
no knowledge of the illegal nature of the wells. 1
79
California has adopted a very short limitations period for
subsurface trespass and conversion by directional wells: 180
days. 180 As to all wells drilled before the effective date of
enactment'' or any wells drilled thereafter which were not in-
tentionally deviated into another's property, the cause of action
accrues ten days after the time when the well is placed in pro-
duction. 8 2 In addition, despite the continuing nature of the act,
only one cause of action exists. 83 In contrast to an unintentional
trespass, a cause of action accrues upon discovery by the ag-
grieved party in the case of a willful trespass. 84 The measure of
damages for conversion resulting from an innocent trespass is
the value of the oil or gas at the time of extraction without
interest, after deducting costs of development, operation, pro-
duction, taxes, and interest on expenditures.1 5 This statute of
limitations has been applied in a number of cases.
86
,18 340 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 926 (1965).
179 Id. at 225-26. The court refused to impute the operator's fraudulent concealment
to the financing institution on an agency concept. Id. at 225.
'SO CAL. Cry. PRoC. CODE § 349 3/4 (West 1982). According to a statement of
policy accompanying this section, the statute was enacted because of the great number
of old wells which unintentionally strayed from the owner's tracts; the methods to
determine the deviated nature of those wells were only recently introduced and were
expensive; many slanted wells could not have been drilled straight; and the threat of a
large number of suits concerning trespassing wells had brought "great and undesirable
confusion and uncertainty in the oil industry." Id.
"I Section 349 3/4 became effective on September 15, 1935. Stafford v. Union Oil




"I Id. For a criticism of this measure of damages, see Kline, supra note 1, at 47-
48 (claiming such statutory enactment may be unconstitutional).
,8 See e.g., 343 P.2d at 380 (well producing thirteen years before action com-
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G. Criminal Conversion (Larceny)
Assume ABC Oil Company intentionally bottoms its well
under XYZ Oil Company's tract and, knowing that it has no
right to do so, extracts oil from the well. Has any crime been
committed?
In People v. Brunwin, s7 the trial court sustained a demurrer
to an indictment charging three defendants with having commit-
ted the crime of grand theft.'"" The indictments alleged that the
defendants had illegally entered into the lands of the
complainant' 9 and converted oil by severing it from the ground
and converting it to their own use. '90 The demurrer was sustained
by the trial court because the oil alleged to be converted "at the
time of taking formed part of the realty from which it was
removed, and that the offense of larceny of realty is unknown
to the law."' 9' The appellate court, finding this to be error,
reversed and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to
overrule the demurrer.
192
,16 See e.g., 343 P.2d at 380 (well producing thirteen years before action com-
menced, no intent to trespass or convert: cause of action barred); Shell Oil Co. v.
Richter, 125 P.2d 930 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (where second operator produces from
improperly deviated well after first operator had been enjoined, plaintiff is not barred
by § 349 3/4's "there shall be but one cause of action for any such act," as production
by the second operator is a different act giving rise to a separate cause of action); Union
Oil Co. v. Domengeaux, 86 P.2d 127 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (suit brought March
13, 1936, 180 days after enactment of § 349 3/4 held not barred: "the general rule for
the computation of time provides for the exclusion of the first day and the inclusion of
the last"); Pacific W. Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 81 P.2d 207 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938),
aff'd, 87 P.2d 1045 (Cal. 1939) (en banc) (defendants not entitled to reimbursement for
costs under the statute because of the intentional trespass and conversion). Section 349
3/4 withstood constitutional challenge on the issues of retroactivity (denial of interest)
and denial of equal protection (applying only to conversion of oil and gas) in Standard
Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 107 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
654, 309 U.S. 673, reh'g denied, 309 U.S. 697 (1940).
,87 37 P.2d 1072 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934).
"I Id. at 1073.
,19The complainant was Pacific Western Oil Company. Id. This criminal case grew
out of the same circumstances involved in Pacific W. Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 81 P.2d
207 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938), aff'd, 87 P.2d 1045 (Cal. 1939) (en banc), where wells
were intentionally deviated, by the defendants charged in People v. Brunwin, with a
whipstock so as to be bottomed under the leasehold estate of Pacific Western. In the
civil action, the defendants were enjoined from operating the deviated wells and damages
were assessed against them for conversion. See Pacific W. Oil Co., 81 P.2d at 207.
1w 37 P.2d at 1073.
,91 Id. at 1074.
92 Id. at 1078.
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Early in its opinion, the court stated: "Obviously, oil which
has been removed from the ground is personal property and the
unlawful taking thereof would constitute larceny just as would
the unlawful taking of any other form of personalty."' 193 How-
ever, the court then proceeded to analyze a number of statutes
and decisions regarding the conversion of real property and the
relaxation of "the rigidity of the common-law rule" appertaining
thereto 194 as though in doubt that the oil became personalty
eo instanti upon severance. Clearly the opinion could have been
unequivocally written so as to hold that oil once severed from
the realty constitutes personal property, for which the illegal
taking and carrying away will be punishable as larceny. 95
CONCLUSION
Although the means exist whereby drillers can drill relatively
straight, vertical wells, crooked wells are not necessarily a thing
of the past. Too, intentionally deviated wells will continue to be
improperly drilled. Because a well bore can purposely or inad-
vertently cross property lines (or encroach upon the minimum
spacing distance of an adjacent tract), an operator must at all
times be cognizant of the rights of a number of parties. Surface
rights, intervening easement rights, and bottom-hole rights must
be considered in any case of controlled directional drilling. It is
urged that directional drilling should be found by a court to be
properly authorized where the operator has the permission of
the surface and mineral owners of the surface-location tract,
and the mineral owners of the bottom-hole tract and any inter-
vening tracts. In any event, carefully drafted instruments can
clarify the rights of the various parties involved.
I d. at 1074.
'I Id. at 1078.
' See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 1987-1988) for a criminal
statute specifically dealing with the conversion of oil or gas. Subsection (a) of the statute
provides that: "A person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property
with intent to deprive the owner of property." Subsection (e) provides that:
Except as provided by Subsection (f) of this section [providing for a greater
penalty in the case of wrongful acts of public servants], an offense under
this section is: (5) a felony of the second degree if: (A) regardless of the
value, the property is: (i) combustible hydrocarbon natural or synthetic
natural gas, or crude petroleum oil ....
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